Public good contribution in experiments may at least partially be driven by the social demand to contribute that is implicit in them. We consider a questionnaire measure and build a behavioural measure of sensitivity to social pressure based on paired dictator and money burning games; we find that the two are related. The evidence for social demand effects on public good contribution is mixed.
Introduction
Social pressure is an obvious potential source of contribution in public good settings (e.g., Amos, 1982) . In the context of public good experiments, it may be connected to a general social norm to cooperate. If this is the case, then results from public good experiments, rather than being attributable to social preferences such as inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or reciprocity (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) , may be largely an artifact of the social demands of the task faced by economic agents. Our note describes an experiment testing this intuition. To put it differently, it tests what Zizzo (2009) labels social experimenter demand effects, though social pressure as a source of public good contribution is obviously of broader relevance and interest than simply what may be happening in the experimental laboratory. It also verifies the extent to which social pressure sensitivity measures are able to predict how purely social punishment may be effective in raising contribution in public good settings, as in Masclet et al. (2003) . 1 Our questionnaire measure relies on the psychology concept of social desirability. Social desirability is the idea that some people's reports of their attitudes or behavior are skewed towards over-reporting positive characteristics (e.g. voting) and under-reporting negative characteristics (e.g. weight, Larson, 2000) .
Psychologists measure social desirability by the means of multi-item questionnaire scales which ask about a selection of social desirable but atypical behaviors e.g. 'I always stay friendly and courteous with other people even when I'm stressed out' (Stober, 2001) . The Stober (2001) 17 items scale is the one used in our experiment.
Our behavioral measure is new but inspired by the important work of Bardsley (2008) and List (2007) , who showed how giving in dictator games is likely to be affected by experimenter demand effects. Like them, we use dictator games where a subject (the dictator) could give k units of money to another subject at a cost of a × k units (with a being a transfer price coefficient). Unlike them, we also had a back-to-1 One of the main findings of recent experimental research on public good games is the effectiveness of punishment in raising cooperation (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000) , particularly with agents that are known to be conditional cooperators (Burlando and Guala, 2005) . Masclet et al. (2003) found that agents in public good games were sensitive to even purely social punishment with no monetary implications.
back symmetrical money burning game where the same dictator could destroy k units of money from another subject at the same cost of a × k units.
2 Other things being equal (including endowments, transfer price and a one-shot interaction with someone subjects knew they had not been matched with and would not be matched with again in the experiment), other-regarding preferences may explain why a subject may give to a stranger without burning (e.g., altruism), or burn without giving (e.g., spite), or neither give or burn (self-interest). They are not, however, able to explain how a subject may both give and burn under these circumstances. Our proxy for behavioral social desirability is then simply based on the sum of giving and burning in back-toback dictator and money burning games.
3
Section 2 describes the experimental design and results and section 3 briefly concludes.
The Experiment
Design. A total of 216 subjects participated to our experiment by coming to two sessions. In the first session they did the social desirability questionnaire. Because of the importance of understanding the questionnaire in its nuances, we aimed to select native English speakers as subjects. In the second session (around 1 or at most 2 weeks later), either they were all invited back to an experimental session (control SDR treatments) or they were invited but sorted depending on whether their social desirability score was high or low (high or low SDR groups). 12 subjects participated to each session 1, 6 to each session 2.
In the second session, subjects carried out five stages, each with a separate player, and subjects knew this. Money was earned in 'experimental points', each worth 1 U.K. penny at the end of the experiment; average payments were 15.55
pounds. The first four stages were pairs of dictator games and money burning games, where subjects played either the role of dictators or that of receivers; receivers did not know the outcome until the end of the experiment. Their endowments were 45 points for the dictator and 145 points for the receiver in stages 1 and 2 and vice versa in stages 3 and 4; this order was counterbalanced across sessions. The transfer price was
(1/3), and so dictators could spend up to 15 points to destroy or transfer up to 45
points from/to the receivers. 4 The back-to-back presentation of each pair of dictator and money burning games was deliberately chosen to make the implied experimenter demand as transparent as possible to the subjects. Dictator choices were incentivized. Receivers were asked to make hypothetical dictator and money burning choices. 5 This and the other simple statistical tests performed here were run at the session level to address the problem of non independence of observations within session. Note that we did not find more interesting results by looking at behavioral social desirability by endowment, i.e. by looking at whether a subject has 45 points or 145 points in each stage 1-4 game. Also, the same relationship was not found (here or elsewhere) with a behavioral social desirability measure based on hypothetical money burning and giving: real incentives do make a difference in the behavioral tasks. showing that, in sessions where dictators gave more, they also destroyed more (ρ = 0.347, p = 0.038). Taking Tables 1, 2 
Conclusions
Back-to-back giving and money burning occurs and appears driven by social experimental demand. The news with public good contribution appears more positive for experimentalists and more negative for policy makers willing to apply vertical social pressure on agents: public good contribution can only partially be predicted by our measures of social pressure, though at least under certain circumstances social pressure does play a role, as signified by interaction effects, or by the average effect of a social punishment technology. That our measures have limitations does not of course mean that new and better measures may not show a stronger role for social pressure in public settings such as ours. And there may also be other forms of experimenter demand effects -related to task construal as opposed to social pressure -that are not captured by our measures. Obviously, further research is needed.
Figure 1. Mean Money Burning and Dictator Game Spending
Treatments were Low (sorted according to a low score on the Stober, 2001, social desirability measure), Control (unsorted) and High (sorted according to a high score on the Stober measure). Each point spent in the games was equivalent to 3 points burnt from or given to the recipient. PunTr: = 1 if punishment treatment, else 0; SDS = social desirability score according to Stober (2001) in Model A and the behavioral measure in Model B, both centered to avoid multicollinearity problems (Marquardt, 1980) ; LInvOwn(Oth): centered lagged own (other) contribution; Age: centered aged; Gender: = 1 for men, 0 for women; NotUK: = 1 for non UK subjects, else 0; Economics = 1 for economics students, else 0. Session level effects are controlled in the regressions. Model B is only defined for dictators in stages 1-4. LDisapproval: centered lagged disapproval points; SDS = social desirability score according to Stober (2001) in Model C and the behavioral measure in Model D, other variables defined as in Table 2 . Session level effects are controlled in the regressions. Model D is only defined for dictators in stages 1-4.
